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3 Bank Lending and Contagion
Evidence from the Asian Crisis
Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart
3.1 Introduction
There have been several major episodes of “contagious currency crises”
during the 1990s. The ﬁrst of these was the Exchange Rate Mechanism
(ERM) crisis of 1992–93. Explanations of why currency instability spread
through Europe frequently stressed the interdependence of ERM coun-
tries via extensive trade in goods and services (see, e.g., Eichengreen, Rose,
and Wyplosz 1996). Yet, the ERM crisis was later followed by the Mexican
peso crisis in late 1994, with its “tequila eﬀect” on Argentina and other
Latin American countries, and the Russian crisis of 1998, which paralyzed
capital ﬂows to emerging markets. There is ample evidence that trade links
are not capable of explaining why Argentina was so hard hit by the devalu-
ation of the Mexican peso, as there is minimal bilateral trade between
Argentina and Mexico and little scope for competition in a common third
market (see Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000 on this issue). Similarly, Russia’s
importance in world trade is hardly capable of explaining why emerging
markets came under such duress following its devaluation and default in
August 1998. The absence of obvious trade links in these episodes and the
growing importance of ﬁnancial markets have led academics, policy mak-
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ers, and the ﬁnancial press to search for other possible explanations of
contagion. Some of these explanations have relied on herding behavior on
the part of investors (see Calvo and Mendoza 2000). Other stories have
suggested that contagion can arise through exposure to common lenders,
be it via hedge funds (as in Calvo 1998) or banks (as in Kaminsky and
Reinhart 2000).
The focus of this paper is to analyze how the crisis in Asia spread during
the second half of 1997. We cast our net wide and investigate several pos-
sible trade and ﬁnancial linkages among the Asian economies which may
help explain why a devaluation in a relatively small country in the region
(i.e., Thailand) had such widespread regional consequences. We proceed
to construct a series of contagion vulnerability indexes, which capture the
various manifestations of exposure through trade and ﬁnance to the initial
crisis country. We contrast the predictions of this vulnerability index to the
actual outcomes during the Asian crisis and compare these results to other
recent crisis episodes in emerging markets. We also pay particular atten-
tion to the role played by Japanese and European banks, which were lend-
ing heavily to emerging Asia on the eve of the crisis.1 Daily interest rates
for Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand, and
exchange rate data are used to assess whether the patterns of causality and
interdependence changed as the crisis spread as well as to answer the
broader question of whether interdependence among selected Asian econ-
omies has changed as the result of the crisis. Our main ﬁndings can be
summarized as follows.
First, as regards the propagation of shocks across national borders dur-
ing the Asian crisis, the behavior of foreign banks, particularly Japanese
banks that began drastically to curtail their lending to the aﬀected Asian
countries following the Thai devaluation, appears to have played a role in
spreading the crisis, particularly to Indonesia, Malaysia, and South Ko-
rea.2 The large exposure of European banks to South Korea and their sub-
sequent retrenchment further deepens the regional liquidity crunch.
Second, only Malaysia and South Korea (in that order) appear to have
any signiﬁcant trade links to Thailand. However, these trade links are indi-
rect, through exports to a common third party. Indeed, there is relatively
little bilateral trade among these emerging Asian economies. Thus, the
spread of crisis to Indonesia and the Philippines cannot be explained
through interdependence arising from a substantial volume of trade in
goods and services.
Third, the contagion vulnerability indexes do reasonably well in antici-
pating which countries were most vulnerable to contagion in three recent
1. Besides Thailand, the aﬀected countries are taken to include Indonesia, Malaysia, the
Philippines, and South Korea.
2. The Philippines had a much lower exposure to Japanese banks.
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crises episodes (the Mexican 1994 devaluation, Brazil’s crisis in early 1999,
and the Asian episode). The indexes, however, are silent as to the severity
of these contagion eﬀects. For example, Indonesia, Malaysia, and South
Korea are all identiﬁed as potential candidates of spillovers from Thailand;
yet Indonesia is shown, ex ante, as the one with the least intensive links to
Thailand; ex post, it experienced the most severe crisis of the three.3
Fourth, the evidence from the daily data suggests that the patterns of
causality and interdependence do change during the course of the crisis,
as turbulence in aﬀected countries such as Indonesia begins to have addi-
tional feedback eﬀects on the other countries, including the initial crisis
country, Thailand. Furthermore, there is a marked diﬀerence in pre- and
post-crisis interest rates and exchange rate linkages among the countries
in our sample. Prior to the crisis, there is little evidence of systematic cau-
sality or interdependence among these ﬁve countries; the post-crisis pat-
terns are markedly diﬀerent, particularly for Indonesia, the Philippines,
and Thailand, all of which show a much greater degree of dependence on
external shocks.
Lastly, Malaysia’s interest rates remain uninﬂuenced by shocks to other
interest rates in the region in the post-crisis sample. This result may be
due to the presence of extensive capital controls—an issue which merits
further scrutiny.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 discusses the patterns in
Japanese, European, and U.S. bank lending to emerging Asia and analyzes
the behavior of foreign bank lending as the crisis unfolds. Section 3.3 dis-
cuses trade linkages and other ﬁnancial channels of contagion. In this sec-
tion, contagion vulnerability indexes are developed and used to analyze
and compare recent crisis episodes. In section 3.4, we study the issue of
cross-country interdependence between daily interest rate and exchange
rate shocks and how international linkages may have changed during the
post-crisis period. The last section presents some brief concluding re-
marks.
3.2 Bank Lending and Contagion in Asia: Stylized Evidence
Much of the recent literature on contagion has suggested that trade links
are a vehicle for the transmission of currency crises across national borders
(see, e.g., Gerlach and Smets 1994 and Glick and Rose 1998). Other recent
papers on the subject have focused on the role that capital markets play in
spreading turbulence internationally (see, e.g., Frankel and Schmukler
1998 and Calvo 1998). Yet nearly all of this literature has ignored the role
that banks can play in transmitting disturbances across countries. This
3. Obviously, diﬀerences across countries in how the crisis is managed by policy makers
can go a long way toward diﬀerences in the severity and duration of the crisis.
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channel of transmission is straightforward. Through its loan portfolio, a
bank may be exposed to a country that has a ﬁnancial crisis. If the crisis
occurs, it impacts the bank’s balance sheet and the bank is faced with the
need to rebalance its portfolio. To make up for the deterioration in the
quality of its loans, the bank may shift away from lending and increase its
holdings of government bonds. Other countries which were borrowing
from the aﬀected bank will be vulnerable to cutbacks in their lines of
credit. Furthermore, if these countries’ loan contracts were of short matu-
rity and the bank’s rebalancing needs are signiﬁcant, the initial crisis could
trigger large capital outﬂows from the other borrowers. That is, not only
may the bank be unwilling to extend new credits to the other borrowers,
it may also refuse to roll over their existing loans—hence, the capital out-
ﬂow. If the capital ﬂow reversal is suﬃciently large and abrupt, it could
spark a ﬁnancial crisis in one or more of the other borrowers. This type of
problem is particularly acute if the borrowers were heavily dependent on
that bank and do not have immediate recourse to alternative sources of
ﬁnancing. The bank’s inability or unwillingness to lend may be com-
pounded by the requirement that banks must provision for bad loans.
In an earlier paper, we examined the potential for contagion through
exposure to a common lender (see Kaminsky and Reinhart 2000). We
found evidence that common bank lenders have played a signiﬁcant role
in the spread of currency crises—indeed, the bank-lending channel out-
performs trade channels in explaining the vulnerability of a country to
contagion.
Contagion during the ERM crises of 1992 and 1993 in Europe and in
Argentina and Brazil following the devaluation of the Mexican peso in
1994 appear to have little to do with the withdrawal of a common bank
creditor. High and rising international interest rates and poor economic
fundamentals have been blamed for the wave of currency and banking
crises that swept developing countries (particularly in Latin America) in
the early 1980s. Yet, badly burned by Mexico’s default in August of 1982,
U.S. banks were rapidly retrenching from the emerging world. The drive to
reduce loan exposure was most acute for Latin America, which depended
almost exclusively on U.S. banks. A more recent example of the role of
banks in propagating disturbances internationally can be found in the
Asian crisis of 1997; the remainder of this section is devoted to this issue.
3.2.1 Banks and Contagion in Asia
International capital had been pouring into much of Asia, most notably
Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand, throughout most of the 1990s. Other
emerging markets, particularly the largest countries in Latin America, ex-
perienced a similar surge in capital inﬂows (see Calvo, Leiderman, and
Reinhart 1996). A key diﬀerence between the two regions, however, was
that an important share of capital inﬂows to Latin America came through
76 Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart
portfolio bond and equity ﬂows, while in Asia, bank lending loomed large,
particularly in the two years preceding the crisis. As shown in Table 3.1,
lending to emerging Asia expanded markedly.4 There were two factors be-
hind this sharp growth in bank credit. Part of the rise in lending was owing
to the European banks’ goal to achieve a higher proﬁle in emerging mar-
kets, particularly in South Korea. Much of the lending boom, however, es-
pecially in the case of Thailand, Indonesia, and South Korea, was owing
to a rapid expansion in credit from Japanese banks. Faced with a slump-
ing economy and little domestic loan demand, Japanese banks increas-
ingly looked overseas to the rapidly growing economies of Southeast Asia
as potential borrowers.
Table 3.2 presents the distribution of lending of U.S., Japanese, and Eu-
ropean banks to emerging Asia. Three features are worth noting. First,
U.S. bank exposure to Asia was modest on the eve of the crisis; emerging
Asia amounted to about US$24 billion (table 3.1) and accounted for only
20 percent of all U.S. bank lending to developing countries (table 3.2).
Second, and by way of contrast, Japanese banks were lending four times
as much as U.S. banks (i.e., US$97 billion) to emerging Asia; the ﬁve crisis
countries listed in table 3.2 accounted for two-thirds of all loans to emerg-
ing markets.5 Third, Japanese banks were most exposed to Thailand—
which is the ﬁrst country to experience a crisis. Indeed, the extent of their
exposure is similar to that of U.S. banks to Mexico in 1982.6 Fourth, Euro-
pean bank lending to emerging Asia was also signiﬁcant and accounted
for about a half of all their lending to emerging markets; South Korea
alone accounted for 40 percent of their lending to the developing world.
4. Emerging Asia comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and
Thailand.
5. Most of the remaining one-third was going to China.
6. See Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) for a comparison of these episodes.
June December June
1997 1997 1998
European banks
US$ billions 85,338 87,846 76,820
Percent change since June 1997 n.a. 2.9 10.0
Japanese banks
US$ billions 97,232 86,651 74,297
Percent change since 1997 n.a. 10.9 23.6
U.S. banks
US$ billions 23,738 21,974 16,566
Percent chance since June 1997 n.a. 7.4 30.2
Notes: Emerging Asia comprises Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and
Thailand. n.a.  not applicable.
Table 3.1 Bank Lending to Emerging Asia, June 1997–June 1998
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Fifth, Japanese banks were quick to pull out of emerging Asia. Between
June and December of 1997, lending by Japanese banks fell by 10 percent,
while lending by European banks actually rose slightly. This is not surpris-
ing in light of the previous discussion. Japanese banks were most exposed
to Thailand; European and U.S. banks were most exposed to South Korea.
The Thai devaluation occurred in early July, while South Korea aban-
doned its defense of the won in mid-November. By June 1998, however,
the reduction in lending to emerging Asia was across the board. United
States bank lending fell by a cumulative 30 percent, representing a de-
cline of about US$5 billion. The 24 percent decline in Japanese bank lend-
ing in June 1997–98, however, translates into a reduction of about US$26
billion.
The previous observations suggest that, even if the banks were not the
immediate trigger of ﬁnancial contagion, their actions certainly made the
spillovers, ﬁrst from Thailand and later from South Korea, far more severe
than they would be otherwise. In the following section, we construct a
composite contagion vulnerability index; exposure to a common bank
creditor ﬁgures prominently in this index.
3.3 A Contagion Vulnerability Index
In this section, we provide a brief review of the “signals” approach that
we will use to assess the probability of a “contagious” currency crisis. This
methodology was ﬁrst used to analyze the performance of a variety of
macroeconomic and ﬁnancial indicators around “twin crises” (i.e., the
joint occurrences of currency and banking crises) in Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (1999).7
In the analysis that follows, we focus on a sample of twenty countries
over the period 1970 to 1998. The countries in our sample are Argentina,
Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Finland, Indonesia, Israel,
Malaysia, Mexico, Norway, Peru, the Philippines, Spain, Sweden, Thai-
land, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. As an out-of-sample exercise, we
apply this approach to analyze South Korea’s vulnerability to contagion
during recent episodes of global ﬁnancial turmoil.
While the preceding section stressed the key role played by foreign
banks in spreading the crises throughout Asia during 1997, this section
will develop a contagion vulnerability index that also allows for other types
of links across countries. Speciﬁcally, we consider both bilateral and third-
party trade links as well as contagion arising from other ﬁnancial channels.
In order to implement the signals approach to analyze contagion, how-
ever, we need to clarify a minimum number of concepts which will be used
throughout the analysis.
7. This methodology is described in some detail in Kaminsky, Lizondo, and Reinhart
(1998), Kaminsky (1998), and Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000).
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3.3.1 Deﬁning Currency Crises
A currency crisis is deﬁned as a situation in which an attack on the
currency leads to substantial reserve losses or a sharp depreciation of the
currency—if the speculative attack is ultimately successful. This deﬁnition
of currency crisis has the advantage that it is comprehensive enough to
capture not only speculative attacks on ﬁxed exchange rates (e.g., Thai-
land’s experience prior to 2 July 1997) but also attacks that force a large
devaluation beyond the established rules of a crawling-peg regime or an
exchange rate band (e.g., Indonesia’s widening of the band prior to its
ﬂotation of the rupiah on 14 August 1997.) Since reserve losses also count,
the index also captures unsuccessful speculative attacks.
We constructed an index of currency-market turbulence as a weighted
average of exchange rate changes and reserve changes. Interest rates were
excluded as many emerging markets in our sample had interest rate con-
trols through much of the sample.
The index, I, is a weighted average of the rate of change of the exchange
rate, e/e, and of reserves, R/R, with weights such that the two compo-
nents of the index have equal sample volatilities
(1) I e
e
R
R
e
R
=
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ −
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ ⋅
⎛
⎝⎜
⎞
⎠⎟ 


,
where e is the standard deviation of the rate of change of the exchange
rate and R is the standard deviation of the rate of change of reserves.
Since changes in the exchange rate enter with a positive weight and
changes in reserves have a negative weight attached, readings of this index
that were three standard deviations or more above the mean were cata-
loged as crises. For countries in the sample that had hyperinﬂation, the
construction of the index was modiﬁed.8 As noted in earlier studies which
use the signals approach, the dates of the crises map well onto the dates
obtained if one were to rely exclusively on events, such as the closing of the
exchange markets or a change in the exchange rate regime, to deﬁne crises.
3.3.2 Deﬁning Contagion
As noted earlier, the term “contagion” has been used to mean diﬀerent
things across studies. In this paper, contagion refers to the case in which
knowing that there is a currency crisis elsewhere increases the probability
80 Graciela L. Kaminsky and Carmen M. Reinhart
8. While a 100 percent devaluation may be traumatic for a country with low to moderate
inﬂation, a devaluation of that magnitude is commonplace during hyperinﬂation. A single
index for the countries that had hyperinﬂation episodes would miss sizable devaluations and
reserve losses in the moderate inﬂation periods, since the historic mean is distorted by the
high-inﬂation episode. To avoid this, we divided the sample according to whether inﬂation
in the previous six months was higher than 150 percent, then constructed an index for each
subsample.
of a crisis at home.9 We are interested in understanding the channels of
transmission of what we call “fundamentals-based contagion,” which
arises when countries are linked via trade or ﬁnance.
Since what we are interested in explaining is how turbulence is transmit-
ted across countries which are connected by trade or ﬁnance and in as-
sessing which of these links are most important, it matters greatly how
we deﬁne “elsewhere.” As in Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), we deﬁne
“elsewhere” by grouping the countries in our sample into various clusters.
As noted in section 3.2, an important source of fundamentals-based conta-
gion in the Asian crisis was countries’ exposure to a common bank lender.
We identify two distinct bank clusters in our sample; one of these clusters
is made up of countries that borrow primarily from U.S. banks, while a
second bank cluster consists of countries where an important share of their
borrowing is concentrated among Japanese banks.
The growing practice of cross-market hedging in recent years also sug-
gests that countries which have (for whatever reason) exhibited a moder-
ately positive correlation of asset returns (with the crisis country) and have
relatively liquid markets may be vulnerable to contagion via cross-market
hedges. We identify two high-correlation clusters in our sample in Asia
and Latin America.
A competitive devaluation story, as in Gerlach and Smets (1994), sug-
gests that a currency crisis in one country may lead to a devaluation in a
second country if the two countries engage in a signiﬁcant amount of bilat-
eral trade. In a similar vein, Corsetti et al. (1998) stress that competitive
devaluation pressures may arise even if two countries do not trade directly
with one another. Such pressures may be present if the two countries are
competing in a common third market.
The countries in each of these clusters are listed in table 3.4.10 On the
basis of the information in tables 3.3 and 3.4, we can construct a rough
index of vulnerability to fundamentals-based contagion for each country
in the sample at each point in time. Consider the case of the Asian crisis,
which began on 2 July 1997 with the devaluation of the Thai baht. To
assess how the Thai devaluation could aﬀect other countries, one could
simply count the number of common clusters through which a country is
exposed to Thailand. For example, Malaysia is in the same bank cluster
as Thailand, as well as in the same high-correlation and third-party trade
clusters—a total of three. The Philippines are also part of the same third-
party trade and Asian high-correlation cluster, but not a part of the Japa-
nese bank cluster—a total of two. Indonesia shares the same high-
correlation and Japanese bank clusters with Thailand—a total of two.
9. This is the deﬁnition used in Eichengreen, Rose, and Wyplosz (1996) and Kaminsky
and Reinhart (2000).
10. Details on the criteria used to deﬁne the clusters are given in Kaminsky and Rein-
hart (2000).
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South Korea borrows from Japanese banks; it is part of the Asian third-
party trade cluster, but asset returns correlation with Thailand is low—
also a total of two. Argentina (for example) is not exposed to Thailand via
any of the ﬁnancial or trade links analyzed here.11 On the basis of this
simple tally, one would conclude that Malaysia is the most vulnerable to
fundamentals-based contagion from Thailand and Argentina the least; but
this simple tally does not allow us to rank the relative vulnerabilities of
Indonesia, the Philippines, and South Korea, as they all share two (al-
though diﬀerent) clusters with Thailand. In the remainder of this section,
we describe an approach that allows us to assign diﬀerent weights in a
contagion vulnerability index to the diﬀerent trade and ﬁnancial links; the
11. It is important to note that this is not an exhaustive analysis of all possible ﬁnancial
sector links. For instance, Brazil and Russia were directly impacted by the Korean crisis, as
Korean ﬁnancial intermediaries sold their holdings of Brazilian and Russian debt (see Calvo
and Reinhart, 1996 for examples and discussion of other potential links).
Table 3.4 Trade and Financial Clusters
Bilateral
High-Correlation Third-Party Trade Trade
Bank Cluster Cluster Cluster Cluster
United Latin Latin Latin
Japan States Asia America Asia America America
Argentina 1 1 1
Bolivia
Brazil 1 1 1 1
Chile 1 1
Colombia 1 1
Denmark
Finland
Indonesia 1 1
Israel
Malaysia 1 1 1
Mexico 1 1 1
Norway
Peru 1
The Philippines 1 1 1
South Koreaa 1 1
Spain
Sweden
Thailand 1 1 1
Turkey
Uruguay 1 1
Venezuela 1 1
Note: See text for detailed explanation.
aNot part of our sample.
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weights will depend on the accuracy of these links in predicting the inci-
dence of contagious crises.
3.3.3 Signals, Noise, and Crises Probabilities
A crisis elsewhere may or may not be a reliable signal of a future crisis
at home. A summary of the possible outcomes is presented in the following
2  2 matrix.
Crisis Occurs in the No Crisis Occurs in the
Following 24 Months Following 24 Months
Signal  1, if there is a crisis elsewhere A B
No signal  0, if no crisis elsewhere C D
A perfect indicator would have entries only in cells A and D. Hence,
with this matrix we can deﬁne several useful concepts which we will use to
evaluate the predictive ability of each of the clusters.
We begin by calculating, for a given sample, the unconditional probabil-
ity of crisis,
(2)
A C
A B C D
P C( ) .=
+
+ + +
If knowing that there is a crisis elsewhere helps predict a crisis at home,
then it can be expected that the probability a of crisis, conditional on a
signal, P(C |S ), is greater than the unconditional probability. Where
(3)
A
A B
P C S( | ) .=
+
Formally,
(4) P C S P C( | ) ( ) .− > 0
If crisis elsewhere is not a “noisy” indicator (prone to sending false
alarms), then there are relatively few entries in cell B and P(C |S )  1.
However, since “elsewhere” is deﬁned diﬀerently for each of the clusters,
their forecasting track records will diﬀer.
We can also deﬁne the noise-to-signal ratio, N/S as,
(5)
N
S
B (B D)
A
A C
=
+
+
/
.
In the remainder of this section, we employ these concepts to provide evi-
dence on the relative merits in anticipating crises of the trade and ﬁ-
nance clusters.
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Table 3.5 presents the results from this exercise for each of the clusters.
As noted in Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000), contagion appears to be a
highly nonlinear process, irrespective of which country grouping scheme
is used. If one-quarter to one-half of the countries in a given cluster have
a crisis, the probability of a crisis at home does not increase by much; this
is shown under the rows labeled 25 to 50 percent. Yet, if more than one-
half of the countries in the cluster have a crisis, the probability of a crisis
at home increases dramatically. This nonlinearity is evident in the marked
declines in the noise-to-signal ratios as the proportion of countries aﬀected
by crises increases. The decline in the noise-to-signal ratio is most dra-
matic for the Latin American bilateral trade cluster, which falls from 2.34
to 0.08. This sharp improvement in forecasting accuracy is also evident in
its marginal predictive ability, P(C |S )  P(C ). The common bank lender
cluster has the lowest noise-to-signal ratio while the third-party trade clus-
ter has the highest. While assessing the predictive ability of the individual
clusters is a useful exercise to discriminate among competing explanations
of contagion, countries which are linked in trade are also often linked in
ﬁnance. This implies that multiple channels of contagion may be operating
at once. To examine exposure to contagion via a variety of channels, we
now turn to the construction of a composite vulnerability index.
3.3.4 Trade and Financial Clusters, and a Composite Contagion Index
Kaminsky (1998) and Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Reinhart (2000) show
how to construct a composite index to gauge the probability of a crisis
conditioned on multiple signals from various indicators (i.e., economic
fundamentals); the more reliable indicators receive a higher weight in this
composite index. This methodology can be readily applied to construct a
composite contagion vulnerability index.
In weighing individual indicators, a good argument can be made for
Table 3.5 Conditional Probabilities and Noise-to-Signal Ratios for Trade and
Financial Clusters
Noise-to- Bank High-Correlation Third-Party Bilateral
Signal Ratio Cluster Cluster Trade Cluster Trade Cluster
25 to 50 0.90 0.58 1.54 2.34
50 and above 0.07 0.39 0.57 0.08
Weight in Vulnerability Index
25 to 50 1.10 1.73 0.64 0.42
50 and above 14.08 2.57 1.75 12.5
P(C |CE )  P(C )
25 to 50 3.1 20.8 6.3 21.8
50 and above 52.0 47.1 30.7 47.3
Source: Based on Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000).
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eliminating from our list of potential leading indicators those variables
which had a noise-to-signal ratio above unity; this is tantamount to stating
that their marginal forecasting ability P(C |S ) is zero or less. Applying this
criterion to our results, we would focus on the case where more than 50
percent of the countries in the cluster are experiencing a crisis. As shown
in table 3.5, the highest noise-to-signal ratio is 0.57, well below unity—
but the track record of the signals in each of the clusters is far from uni-
form. Thus, we weigh the signals by the inverse of the noise-to-signal ratios
reported in table 3.5.
Formally, we construct the following composite indicator,
(6) I
S
t
j
n
t
j
j
=
=
∑
1 
.
In equation (6) it is assumed that there are n diﬀerent indicators (i.e., clus-
ters). Each cluster has a diﬀerentiated ability to forecast crises and, as
before, this ability can be summarized by the noise-to-signal ratio, here
denoted by  j, S jt is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the univariate
indicator, S j, crosses its critical threshold and is thus signaling a crisis and
zero otherwise. As before, the noise-to-signal ratio is calculated under the
assumption that an indicator issues a correct signal if a crisis occurs within
the following twenty-four months. All other signals are considered false
alarms.
The maximum value that this composite vulnerability index could score
is 30.9 if a country belonged to the same four clusters as the crisis country.
This score is a simple sum of the inverse of the noise-to-signal ratio.
3.3.5 Evidence from Three Recent Crisis Episodes
We now consider, on the basis of the trade and ﬁnancial sector linkages
discussed here, which countries would have been classiﬁed as vulnerable
to contagion during three recent episodes of currency crises in emerging
markets. The ﬁrst of these episodes begins with the devaluation of the
Mexican peso in December 1994.
On the heels of the Mexican devaluation, Argentina and Brazil were the
countries to come under the greatest speculative pressure. In a matter of
a few weeks in early 1995, the central bank of Argentina lost about 20
percent of its foreign exchange reserves, and bank deposits fell by about
18 percent as capital ﬂed the country. Such a severe outcome could hardly
be attributed to trade linkages and competitive devaluation pressures, as
Argentina does not trade with Mexico on a bilateral basis and does not
compete with Mexican exports in a common third market.12 In the case
of Brazil, the speculative attack was more brief, although the equity mar-
12. See Kaminsky and Reinhart (2000) for details on the pattern of trade.
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ket sustained sharp losses. Both of these countries record high readings
in their vulnerability indexes following the Mexican devaluation. While
the eﬀects on Asia of the Mexican crisis were relatively mild, the country
which encountered the most turbulence in the region was the Philippines,
which also registers a relatively high vulnerability score.
In the case of the Thai crisis, Malaysia shares both trade and ﬁnance
links with Thailand. For the other Asian countries the potential channels
of transmission are fewer. As noted earlier, the Philippines are part of the
same third-party trade cluster as Thailand, which receives a weight of 1.75
(i.e., 1/0.57) in the composite index; it is also part of the Asian high-
correlation cluster, which receives a weight of 2.57 (i.e., 1/0.39) in the in-
dex. Indonesia shares the same high-correlation cluster with Thailand and
is a part of the Japanese bank cluster, which receives a weight of 14.08
(i.e., 1/0.07). Hence, as shown in table 3.6, Indonesia’s and the Philippines’
contagion vulnerability indexes score 16.65 and 4.32, respectively. South
Korea, as noted in section 3.2, also borrowed heavily from Japanese banks.
Accordingly, its exposure to Thailand came more from having a common
lender than from conventional competitive trade pressures.
Table 3.6 A Contagion Vulnerability Index
Contagion Vulnerability Index
December 1994: July 1997: January 1999:
Mexican Crisis Thai Crisis Brazilian Crisis
Argentina 16.65 0 29.15
Bolivia 0 0 0
Brazil 18.4 0 n.a.
Chile 0 0 26.58
Colombia 12.5 0 15.83
Denmark 0 0 0
Finland 0 0 0
Indonesia 0 16.65 0
Israel 0 0 0
Malaysia 0 28.33 0
Mexico n.a. 0 18.4
Norway 0 0 0
Peru 2.57 0 2.57
The Philippines 14.08 4.32 14.08
South Korea 0 26.58 0
Spain 0 0 0
Sweden 0 0 0
Thailand 0 n.a. 0
Turkey 0 0 0
Uruguay 0 0 26.58
Venezuela 12.5 0 15.83
Note: n.a.  not applicable.
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The most recent of these emerging market crises was Brazil’s devalua-
tion of the real in early 1999. Not surprisingly, Argentina, which has both
trade (Mercosur) and ﬁnancial linkages with Brazil, shows the highest vul-
nerability; other Mercosur countries come close in suit.
3.4 Contagion and Interdependence: Interest Rates and Exchange Rates
The preceding discussion has suggested that, even in the absence of any
shifts in market sentiment or herding behavior on the part of investors,
there are multiple reasons that a crisis in one country may have important
repercussions on other countries which are exposed to the crisis through
ﬁnancial or trade arrangements. Yet these fundamental channels of crisis
transmission are not likely to emerge or disappear quickly. Developing
mutually satisfactory trade arrangements or building close ties with pos-
sible creditors may take time and is not likely to change dramatically from
one moment to the next. For example, as shown in table 3.2, countries
which were in the Japanese-bank cluster before the crisis remain so after
the crisis; a similar statement can be made about the U.S. borrower group.
A proximate way to explore whether vulnerability to “true contagion”—
that is, interdependence that cannot be accounted for by the kinds of con-
ventional trade or ﬁnance links that we have focused on thus far—may
be to examine causal patterns (or interdependence) among the aﬀected
countries in market-determined variables such as interest rates, exchange
rates, and stock returns. One possible explanation of contagion has to do
with the “wake-up call hypothesis” (see Goldstein, Kaminsky, and Rein-
hart 2000), which suggests that the initial crisis serves as a wake-up call,
leading investors to reassess the risks of other countries which share some
of the vulnerabilities with the crisis country—irrespective of whether they
have a common bank lender or are linked in trade. Alternatively, herding
may arise even when investors are rational if verifying rumors (or informa-
tion in general) is costly (see Calvo and Mendoza 2000). If rumors become
more frequent in the aftermath of a crisis, this may impart greater interde-
pendence or increased comovement among ﬁnancial indicators across
countries.
3.4.1 Methodology Issues
To examine whether there is greater interdependence or unidirectional
causal links among ﬁve of the aﬀected Asian countries following the ﬁ-
nancial crisis that began with the 2 July 1997 devaluation of the Thai baht,
we assembled daily data on domestic interest rates and exchange rates for
Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, and Thailand. The
data begin on 1 January 1996 and run through July 1999. Hence, there a
roughly comparable number of observations prior to the crisis (392 obser-
vations) and following the crises (334 observations.) We employ a simple
vector autoregression (VAR) framework, which treats all variables as po-
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tentially endogenous, and include ten lags of each of the variables in the
system. Omitting time subscripts, a representative equation for domestic
interest rates (r) in Indonesia (denoted by the subscript i) in this ﬁve-
equation system is given by
(7) r A L r A L r A L r A L r A L ri i i m p sk t i= + + + + + + 1 2 3 4 5( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .ε
The subscripts m, p, sk, and t refer to Malaysia, the Philippines, South
Korea, and Thailand, respectively. The lag operators are the A ’s and ε’s
denote the random shocks. A comparable system was estimated for daily
changes in the exchange rate (in percent). For each block of regressors we
conducted F- and log-likelihood ratio tests that tested the null hypothesis
of no causal relationship.
3.4.2 Interest Rate and Exchange Rate Links: Evidence from Asia
Table 3.7 reports the results for interest rates; the detailed test statistics
and their associated probability values are presented in appendix tables
3A.1–3A.4. The columns “cause” the rows; an N denotes that the null
hypothesis of no causality was not rejected while a Y indicates rejection
of the null hypothesis at a 5 percent level of signiﬁcance or higher. For
example, the top row, which summarizes the results for Indonesia for the
1 January 1996–1 July 1997 period, shows four N entries, indicating that
interest rates in the four remaining countries in the system had no system-
atic inﬂuence on Indonesian interest rates. The last column of table 3.7
tallies the number of signiﬁcant entries. Table 3.8 summarizes in compa-
rable manner the results for the daily exchange rate changes.
Several features of the pre- and post-crisis results for interest rate pat-
terns are worth noting. First, for the precrisis sample, none of the re-
gressors (other than lags of the dependent variable) are statistically signif-
icant at standard conﬁdence levels. Second, the post-crisis period is quite
diﬀerent in that regard with a greater degree of interdependence among
the countries. Fluctuation in Thai and Philippine interest rates signiﬁ-
cantly inﬂuences interest rates in Indonesia. Likewise, interest rates in In-
donesia inﬂuence the Philippines and Thailand. Third, interdependence
was most intense during the period immediately following the Thai devalu-
ation and the subsequent devaluation of the Korean won on 17 Novem-
ber 1997.
Fourth, Malaysian interest rates are not signiﬁcantly aﬀected by interest
rate developments in the other four countries in the full post-crisis period.
One could speculate that this insulation may be due to the introduction of
exchange controls in September 1998. Indeed, prior to the imposition of
exchange restrictions, Malaysian interest rates were inﬂuenced by other
countries’ interest rates during the height of the crisis in July 1997–April
1998.
Fifth, no clean unidirectional causality pattern from Thailand to the
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other countries emerges from this exercise—not even in the earlier stages
of the crisis. For the period 2 July 1997–16 November 1997, there is causal-
ity from Thailand to Indonesia and South Korea but not to the Philippines
or Malaysia. Indeed, as the crisis progresses causal relationships among
the countries most often go both ways.
Turning to the patterns that emerge from performing the same exercise
on daily exchange rate changes, there are important similarities with the
results for interest rates. First, for the precrisis sample none of the re-
gressors (other than lags of the dependent variable) are statistically sig-
niﬁcant at standard conﬁdence levels—as was the case for interest rates.
Second, during the post-crisis period there is a much greater degree of
interdependence among the exchange rates of the ﬁve countries—even
greater than that exhibited by interest rates.
Third, exchange rates in the two smaller countries in the group, the Phil-
ippines and Thailand, are the most inﬂuenced by exchange rate develop-
ments elsewhere in the region. In the case of the Philippines, all four ex-
change rates (baht, ringgit, rupiah, and won) are statistically signiﬁcant
in the regressions; for Thailand, nearly all. This may be consistent with
evidence of “large neighbor eﬀects” on capital ﬂow movements.13 Fourth,
changes in the Korean won (South Korea is the largest country of this
group) signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the remaining four currencies in the post-
crisis period.
Taken together, these results suggest that interdependence among cur-
rencies and interest rates among these ﬁve Asian economies has increased
in the wake of the ﬁnancial crisis. Given that trade and ﬁnancial linkages
have not changed markedly during this recent period, one interpretation
for this greater interdependence is that, in the aftermath of the crisis, ﬁ-
nancial market participants are more likely to lump these economies into
one group than they were previously.
3.5 Thoughts on Further Research
This paper has suggested that ﬁnancial sector links have played an in-
creasingly important role in the 1990s in transmitting disturbances across
national boundaries. Many of the channels of transmission (i.e., cross-
market hedges) and many of the agents (i.e., hedge funds and mutual
funds) are still relatively novel, particularly in the context of emerging mar-
ket ﬁnance. As such, these potential channels of interdependence merit
much closer scrutiny at both the theoretical and empirical dimensions.
Microeconomic data at the institutional level are certainly bound to in-
crease our understanding of the role played by capital markets and their
new instruments in an increasingly globalized environment.
13. See Calvo and Reinhart (1998) for applications to Latin America.
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In addition, while banks in ﬁnancial centers have a long history of lend-
ing to the developing world and booms and busts in such lending are not
a new phenomenon, banks’ lending strategies and decisions are still not
well understood. Foreign banks’ lending practices may be a source of in-
stability to emerging markets when the shock originates at the center, as it
did with the sharp rise in U.S. interest rates in October 1979, or when the
shock originates in the diﬃculties faced by a relatively small borrower (i.e.,
Thailand) to whom the banks have substantial exposure. To gain insights
into this phenomenon, it is necessary to go beyond the aggregate macro-
economic data and analyze the response of individual bank balance sheets
and lending decisions to the kinds of shocks discussed in this paper. This
analysis is not only useful for better understanding past booms and busts
in foreign lending—it is of increasing relevance in anticipating future ones.
Indeed, given the trend in many emerging markets toward greater open-
ness in their ﬁnancial sectors and a rising presence of foreign or “truly
international” banks, the issue of what role these banks play in transmit-
ting disturbances across borders is of increasing relevance.
Appendix
Causality Tests
Table 3A.1 Daily Interest Rates, 1 January 1996–1 July 1997
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Indonesia
f-statistic 0.82 0.15 0.51 0.09
(0.61) (0.99) (0.88) (0.99)
Log-likelihood 9.33 1.77 5.79 1.03
(0.50) (0.99) (0.83) (0.99)
Malaysia
f-statistic 1.02 0.45 1.25 0.78
(0.43) (0.92) (0.26) (0.64)
Log-likelihood 11.54 5.13 14.10 8.92
(0.32) (0.88) (0.17) (0.54)
The Philippines
f-statistic 1.31 0.45 0.70 0.55
(0.22) (0.92) (0.73) (0.85)
Log-likelihood 14.73 5.18 7.96 6.30
(0.14) (0.88) (0.63) (0.79)
South Korea
f-statistic 0.69 1.15 1.23 0.43
(0.73) (0.32) (0.26) (0.93)
Log-likelihood 7.87 13.04 13.90 4.90
(0.64) (0.22) (0.18) (0.90)
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Thailand
f-statistic 0.18 0.57 0.46 1.09
(0.99) (0.84) (0.92) (0.37)
Log-likelihood 2.02 6.49 5.20 12.31
(0.99) (0.77) (0.88) (0.26)
Notes: Number of observations  392. Probability numbers in parentheses.
Table 3A.1 (continued)
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Table 3A.2 Daily Interest Rates, 2 July 1997–1 July 1999
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Indonesia
f-statistic 0.37 2.44 0.38 2.34
(0.95) (0.01)** (0.95) (0.01)**
Log-likelihood 4.36 27.64 4.47 26.49
(0.93) (0.00)** (0.92) (0.00)**
Malaysia
f-statistic 0.48 0.68 0.23 0.82
(0.90) (0.74) (0.99) (0.61)
Log-likelihood 5.65 7.97 2.74 9.52
(0.84) (0.63) (0.99) (0.48)
The Philippines
f-statistic 1.49 1.24 0.71 1.61
(0.14) (0.26) (0.71) (0.10)**
Log-likelihood 17.09 14.36 8.29 18.46
(0.07)* (0.16) (0.60) (0.05)**
South Korea
f-statistic 0.38 0.30 0.22 0.30
(0.95) (0.98) (0.99) (0.98)
Log-likelihood 4.49 3.57 2.63 3.51
(0.92) (0.96) (0.98) (0.97)
Thailand
f-statistic 3.12 0.58 2.19 0.43
(0.00)** (0.83) (0.02)** (0.93)
Log-likelihood 34.93 6.80 24.91 5.09
(0.00)** (0.74) (0.01)** (0.88)
Notes: Number of observations  334. Probability numbers in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent conﬁdence level.
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
Table 3A.4 Daily Interest Rates, 17 November 1997–30 April 1998
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Indonesia
f-statistic 0.47 1.71 1.31 1.84
(0.90) (0.10)* (0.24) (0.07)*
Log-likelihood 8.01 26.65 20.95 28.55
(0.63) (0.00)** (0.02)** (0.00)**
Malaysia
f-statistic 0.47 0.19 1.19 1.18
(0.90) (0.99) (0.32) (0.32)
Log-likelihood 7.93 3.23 19.12 18.99
(0.64) (0.97) (0.04)** (0.04)**
Table 3A.3 Daily Interest Rates, 2 July 1997–16 November 1997
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Indonesia
f-statistic 1.06 0.72 0.48 1.66
(0.41) (0.70) (0.90) (0.12)
Log-likelihood 19.71 13.90 9.39 29.42
(0.03)** (0.18) (0.50) (0.00)**
Malaysia
f-statistic 1.11 1.37 1.17 0.41
(0.37) (0.22) (0.33) (0.93)
Log-likelihood 20.68 24.78 21.28 8.19
(0.02)** (0.01)** (0.02)** (0.48)
The Philippines
f-statistic 0.61 1.52 0.46 0.77
(0.80) (0.16) (0.91) (0.66)
Log-likelihood 11.79 27.27 9.11 14.66
(0.30) (0.00)** (0.52) (0.15)
South Korea
f-statistic 1.49 1.59 1.40 1.10
(0.17) (0.14) (0.21) (0.38)
Log-likelihood 29.69 28.30 25.37 20.36
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.01)** (0.03)**
Thailand
f-statistic 0.79 0.64 1.68 1.73
(0.64) (0.77) (0.11) (0.10)*
Log-likelihood 15.02 12.35 29.78 30.44
(0.13) (0.26) (0.00)** (0.00)**
Notes: Number of observations  99. Probability numbers in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent conﬁdence level.
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
(continued)
Table 3A.5 Daily Exchange Rate Changes, 1 January 1996–1 July 1997
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Indonesia
f-statistic 0.71 0.50 0.51 0.71
(0.71) (0.89) (0.88) (0.71)
Log-likelihood 8.03 5.71 5.83 8.13
(0.63) (0.84) (0.83) (0.62)
Malaysia
f-statistic 1.38 0.58 0.83 0.68
(0.19) (0.83) (0.60) (0.74)
Log-likelihood 15.54 6.65 9.38 7.74
(0.11) (0.76) (0.50) (0.65)
The Philippines
f-statistic 1.11 0.93 0.89 1.54
(0.35) (0.50) (0.54) (0.12)
Log-likelihood 12.58 10.55 10.11 17.36
(0.25) (0.39) (0.43) (0.07)*
South Korea
f-statistic 0.48 0.78 0.97 0.45
(0.90) (0.64) (0.46) (0.92)
Log-likelihood 5.52 8.90 11.01 5.16
(0.85) (0.54) (0.36) (0.88)
Thailand
f-statistic 0.17 0.73 1.41 0.93
(0.99) (0.70) (0.17) (0.51)
Log-likelihood 1.91 8.29 15.86 10.47
(0.99) (0.60) (0.10)* (0.40)
Notes: Number of observations  392. Probability numbers in parentheses.
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
The Philippines
f-statistic 1.17 1.34 1.08 1.04
(0.33) (0.22) (0.39) (0.42)
Log-likelihood 18.92 21.34 17.62 17.00
(0.04)** (0.02)** (0.06)* (0.07)*
South Korea
f-statistic 3.72 1.17 1.06 1.58
(0.00)** (0.33) (0.41) (0.13)
Log-likelihood 51.99 18.89 17.20 24.84
(0.00)** (0.04)** (0.07)* (0.01)**
Thailand
f-statistic 2.49 0.57 1.52 1.13
(0.01)** (0.83) (0.15) (0.35)
Log-likelihood 37.11 9.65 23.94 18.281
(0.00)** (0.47) (0.01)** (0.05)**
Notes: Number of observations  119. Probability numbers in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent conﬁdence level.
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
Table 3A.4 (continued)
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Table 3A.7 Daily Exchange Rate Changes, 2 July 1997–16 November 1997
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Indonesia
f-statistic 1.11 0.76 1.67 0.83
(0.38) (0.66) (0.12) (0.61)
Log-likelihood 20.53 14.61 29.56 15.71
(0.02)** (0.15) (0.01)** (0.11)
Malaysia
f-statistic 0.49 0.25 0.57 0.53
(0.89) (0.99) (0.83) (0.86)
Log-likelihood 9.64 5.00 11.06 10.34
(0.47) (0.89) (0.35) (0.41)
The Philippines
f-statistic 1.13 1.66 0.66 4.06
(0.35) (0.12) (0.75) (0.00)**
Log-likelihood 20.99 29.47 12.80 60.63
(0.02)** (0.00)** (0.23) (0.00)**
Table 3A.6 Daily Exchange Rate Changes, 2 July 1997–1 July 1999
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Indonesia
f-statistic 1.95 1.07 3.19 0.85
(0.04)** (0.39) (0.00)** (0.59)
Log-likelihood 21.22 11.67 34.17 9.29
(0.02)** (0.31) (0.00)** (0.51)
Malaysia
f-statistic 1.09 1.08 1.89 1.27
(0.37) (0.38) (0.04)** (0.25)
Log-likelihood 11.98 11.83 20.57 13.85
(0.29) (0.30) (0.02)** (0.18)
The Philippines
f-statistic 1.74 2.79 4.07 3.18
(0.07)* (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Log-likelihood 18.94 30.00 43.22 34.08
(0.04)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
South Korea
f-statistic 1.87 1.36 0.97 0.45
(0.05)** (0.19) (0.47) (0.92)
Log-likelihood 20.28 14.85 11.01 5.16
(0.03)** (0.14) (0.36) (0.88)
Thailand
f-statistic 3.58 3.03 1.41 3.62
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.17) (0.00)**
Log-likelihood 38.24 32.57 15.42 38.68
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.12) (0.00)**
Notes: Number of observations  334. Probability numbers in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent conﬁdence level.
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
(continued)
Table 3A.8 Daily Exchange Rate Changes, 17 November 1997–30 April 1998
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
Indonesia
f-statistic 0.77 1.28 1.44 0.53
(0.66) (0.26) (0.18) (0.87)
Log-likelihood 12.71 20.51 22.84 8.88
(0.24) (0.02)** (0.01)** (0.54)
Malaysia
f-statistic 0.75 0.38 0.57 1.24
(0.68) (0.95) (0.83) (0.28)
Log-likelihood 12.45 6.54 9.62 19.88
(0.26) (0.77) (0.47) (0.03)**
The Philippines
f-statistic 2.58 2.62 2.19 1.24
(0.01)** (0.01)** (0.03)** (0.28)
Log-likelihood 38.22 38.82 33.16 19.90
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.00)** (0.03)**
South Korea
f-statistic 1.99 1.43 1.94 2.93
(0.05)** (0.19) (0.05)** (0.00)**
Log-likelihood 30.48 22.65 29.90 42.67
(0.00)** (0.01)** (0.00)** (0.00)**
Thailand
f-statistic 1.40 0.82 0.75 1.36
(0.20) (0.61) (0.68) (0.22)
Log-likelihood 22.25 13.57 12.42 21.68
(0.01)** (0.19) (0.26) (0.02)**
Notes: Number of observations  119. Probability numbers in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent conﬁdence level.
South Korea
f-statistic 2.15 1.93 0.97 0.62
(0.04)** (0.06) (0.49) (0.79)
Log-likelihood 36.67 33.51 18.14 12.00
(0.00)** (0.00)** (0.05)** (0.29)
Thailand
f-statistic 1.87 1.59 1.29 2.17
(0.07)* (0.14) (0.26) (0.04)**
Log-likelihood 32.5 28.31 23.63 36.96
(0.00)** (0.02)** (0.01)** (0.00)**
Notes: Number of observations  99. Probability numbers in parentheses.
**Signiﬁcant at 5 percent conﬁdence level.
*Signiﬁcant at 10 percent conﬁdence level.
Table 3A.7 (continued)
The South
Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Korea Thailand
References
Bank for International Settlements. Various issues. Annual report.
Calvo, G. A. 1998. Capital market contagion and recession: An explanation of the
Russian virus. College Park, Md.: University of Maryland.
Calvo, G. A., and E. Mendoza. 2000. Rational contagion and the globalization of
securities markets. Journal of International Economics 51 (1): 79–113.
Calvo, G. A., L. Leiderman, and C. Reinhart. 1996. Capital ﬂows to developing
countries in the 1990s: Causes and eﬀects. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10
(Spring): 123–37.
Calvo, S., and C. M. Reinhart. 1998. Capital ﬂows to Latin America: Is there evi-
dence of contagion eﬀects? In Private capital ﬂows to emerging markets, ed. G. A.
Calvo, M. Goldstein, and E. Hochreitter, 151–71. Washington, D.C.: Institute
for International Economics.
Corsetti, G., P. Pesenti, N. Roubini, and C. Tille. 1998. Structural links and conta-
gion eﬀects in the Asian crisis: A welfare based approach. New York, N.Y.: New
York University.
Eichengreen, B., A. Rose, and C. Wyplosz. 1996. Contagious currency crises.
NBER Working Paper no. 5681. Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research.
Frankel, J. A., and S. Schmukler. 1998. Crisis, contagion, and country funds. In
Managing capital ﬂows and exchange rates, ed. R. Glick, 232–66. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Gerlach, S., and F. Smets. 1994. Contagious speculative attacks. CEPR Discussion
Paper no. 1055. London: Center for Economic Policy Research.
Glick, R., and A. Rose. 1998. Contagion and trade: Why are currency crises re-
gional? Berkeley: University of California.
Goldstein, M., G. L. Kaminsky, and C. M. Reinhart. 2000. Assessing ﬁnancial vul-
nerability: Developing an early warning system for emerging markets. Washing-
ton, D.C.: Institute for International Economies.
Kaminsky, G. L. 1998. Currency and banking crises: The early warnings of dis-
tress. International Finance Discussion Paper no. 629, October. Washington,
D.C.: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.
Kaminsky, G. L., S. Lizondo, and C. M. Reinhart. 1998. Leading indicators of
currency crises. IMF Staﬀ Papers 45 (March): 1–48.
Kaminsky, G. L., and C. M. Reinhart. 1999. The twin crises: The causes of bank-
ing and balance of payments problems, American Economic Review 89 (3):
473–500.
———. 2000. On crises, contagion, and confusion. Journal of International Eco-
nomics 51 (1): 145–68.
Kaminsky, G. L., and S. Schmukler. 1999. What triggers market jitters? A chronicle
of the Asian crisis. Journal of International Money and Finance 18 (4): 537–60.
Comment Eiji Ogawa
Kaminsky and Reinhart’s paper empirically analyzes whether ﬁnancial
sector links via common bank lenders form a powerful channel for funda-
Eiji Ogawa is professor of commerce at Hitotsubashi University.
Bank Lending and Contagion 99
